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EQUAL PROTECTION, TITLE VII, AND
SEX-BASED MORTALITY TABLES
INTRODUCTION
Mary Robertson is a teacher in an Indiana school district. She
contributes three percent of her annual salary to an annuity account
maintained by the Indiana State Teachers' Retirement Fund. When she
retires she will receive approximately fifteen dollars per month less than
a male teacher who has contributed the same amount to the fund. ' Marie
Manhart is an employee of the City of Los Angeles, Department of Water
and Power. She contributes a portion of her salary to the department's
retirement plan and her contribution is matched by her employer in an
amount equal to 110% of her contribution. A male employee with the
same salary contributes fifteen percent less to the plan. Upon retirement,
Marie Manhart and her male counterpart will receive identical monthly
checks but she will have contributed more into the retirement plan.2
The reason for these discrepancies can be traced to the fact that both
retirement plans utilize sex-based mortality tables to compute, in one
case, the amount of the benefit, and in the other, the amount of an
employee's contribution to the annuity fund. Since these tables reflect
that, on the average, women live five years longer than men, the two
funds require, respectively, that a woman who makes the same contribu-
tion as a man must receive a smaller monthly check because she will live
five years longer in which to collect her annuity payment, and that a
woman who receives the same monthly check as a man must make a
larger contribution to the fund since she will be likely to receive an extra
five years of payments.
One case, Reilly v. Robertson, held that such dissimilar treatment
of similarly situated employees violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.3 The other case,
Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power, held
1. Reilly v. Robertson, 360 N.E.2d 171, 172 (Ind.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 73 (1977).
2. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water and Power, 553 F.2d 581,583 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 51 (1977).
3. 360 N.E.2d at 179.
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that the treatment violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 It is
the thesis of this article that despite these similar results, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Manhart was correct in its judgment and
the Indiana Supreme Court in Reilly was incorrect. This article will
carefully examine the rationales of the two cases.' Annuities, the context
in which the dissimilar treatment arises, and the use of sex-based mortali-
ty tables will also be explained and analyzed.6 This article will then
independently evaluate the applicability of the fourteenth amendment and
of Title VII, and conclude that although Title VII has been violated the
fourteenth amendment has not.7 This examination will also reveal that
Title VII requires equal contributions and equal benefits in the context of
annuity funds. Finally, the objections of male annuitants will be con-
sidered and refuted.8
I. THE USE OF MORTALITY TABLES IN THE ANNUITY CONTEXT
Understanding how a sex-based mortality table works is essential to
determining if a violation of either the fourteenth amendment or Title VII
has occurred. This understanding must include what an annuity is, how it
operates, the purposes of a retirement plan, and the justifications for the
use of these tables.
Sex-Based Mortality Tables
A mortality table is made up of two columns of figures showing the
number of people living and dying at designated ages. From it, the death
rate for each age can be determined. 9 A mortality table may be construct-
ed from general population statistics, but the tables in use today, which
are required by most state insurance departments, have been constructed
from the mortality statistics of insured lives." Data is collected showing
(1) the age at which persons come under observation; (2) the duration of
the period of observation; and (3) the number dying during one year, for
4. 553 F.2d at 590.
5. See notes 27-68 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 9-26 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 69-94 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 95-107 infra and accompanying text.
9. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 124 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as FACT BOOK]. The mortality tables at issue in Reilly were the 1971
Group Annuity Mortality Tables-Male and that same table, with a five year set-back, was
used for female teachers. 360 N.E.2d at 173. See FACT BOOK at 108-09 for a reprint of the
former table.
10. S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE 132 (5th ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as
HUEBNER]. The reason tor this is that statistics of insurance companies bear out the fact
that if the population as a whole were divided into those who were insured and those who
1977]
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each age.'1 This data is subsequently compiled into a mortality table.
Using the table one can determine both the probability of death and the
probability of survival for an individual of a certain age. 12
The foremost purpose of a mortality table is to enable an insurer to
calculate contribution rates. Its purpose is not to provide a determination
of when an individual will die but to provide a determination of the death
rate of a group as a whole. 13 It is on the basis of this death rate that an
insurer sets the contribution rates. 14 The death rate determines the insur-
er's cost and this cost determines the contribution level.
A mortality table can be made up of various groupings of individu-
als,15 but the grouping chosen must consist of a sufficiently large number
of individuals to allow the law of average to operate.16 Obviously, there
must be a high correlation between the grouping chosen and the rate of
mortality. Insurers prefer both that the grouping be one which includes
the greatest number of similar individuals and that the similarity these
individuals share be one highly predictive of the individuals' longevity.
Present mortality tables are sex-based. An example is the tables
were uninsured, the former group would show a much lower rate of mortality than the
latter. An attempted explanation for this phenomenom in the context of annuities is that
annuities result in freedom from the financial burdens of retirement:
Freedom from financial worry and fear, and contentment with a double
income, are conducive to longevity. If it be true that half of human ailments are
probably attributable at least in part to fear and worry, the effectiveness of
annuities towards health and happiness must be apparent. I am inclined to believe
that annuities serve in old age much the same economic purpose that periodic
medical examinations do during the working years of life.
HUEBNER at 104.
11. Id. at 135. It should be noted that this data is required from a great number of
individuals to guarantee that the law of average works correctly. This requires a large
number of individuals to guarantee that great fluctuations in the results will be eliminated.
See id. at 123-31 for a discussion of the law of average as it relates to the theory behind a
mortality table.
12. These probabilities will be conservatively stated, however, as compared to the
actual mortality rates expected. This conservatism is necessary because an insurer who
overestimates the mortality rate of its annuitants (thus underestimating their life expectan-
cies) will not have collected enough money in contributions to make the monthly pay-
ments to those annuitants who exceed their life expectancies. Indeed, a note accompany-
ing 1971 Group Annuity Mortality Table-Male states that it is "conservative as related to
the actual experience upon which [it is] based." FACT BOOK, supra note 9, at 109. For an
example of this conservatism, see the above mentioned table, which estimates that of 1000
males aged 109 years old, only 725.52 of them are likely to die within the year. Id.
13. A mortality table can predict fairly accurately the death rate of a group because of
the law of average. See note 11 supra. Because, however, of the wide individual fluctua-
tions within a group (which are ironed out due to the great number of individuals making
up the group) the table is not very useful as an indicator of individual life expectance. It
can only reflect the probability that out of a certain number of individuals, death will
occur at a certain rate.
14. See note 22 infra.
15. See HuEBNER, supra note 10, at 482-87 for various groupings possible.
16. See note 11 supra.
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utilized in Reilly. Those tables consisted of one set of statistics for men
and the same set, but with a five year set-back, for women. 17 The reason
for this is the inescapable fact that women as a group live longer than
men as a group.1 8 No matter what the reasons are for female longevity,1 9
it is obvious that it makes sex a desirable grouping characteristic to
insurers; it groups a great number of individuals and the similarity these
individuals share is highly predictive of the individuals' longevity.
Annuities
An annuity is a periodic payment which is to commence at a stated
or contingent date and to continue throughout a fixed period, or for the
duration of a life or lives, in return for the payment of a stipulated
amount.2 ° In the contexts of Reilly and Manhart, an annuity is a monthly
payment commencing upon retirement and continuing for the duration
of the annuitant's life. It should be emphasized that an annuitant will
collect the periodic payments for as long as he or she lives: the amount
accumulated as a result of the annuitant's contributions into the annuity
account does not limit the number of monthly payments or total amount
which he or she may eventually receive. Likewise, however, the annuit-
ant may not recover the entirety of his or her contributions because the
annuitant's death will terminate the payments. 21 Therefore, an annuity
17. See note 9 supra.
18. Gerber, The Economic and Actuarial Aspects of Selection and Classification, 10
FORUM 1205, 1218 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FORUM]. See FACT BOOK, supra note 9, at
91 for tables compiled by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
showing Expectation of Life at Birth in the United States and Expectation of Life at
Various Ages in the United States, 1975. The latter table reveals that at age 65 male life
expectancy is 13.7 years and female life expectancy is 18.0 years. Not only do women as a
group live longer but also the gain in life expectancy for women since the turn of the
century has been greater than for men at nearly all ages. Id.
19. As to the reasons for the longevity of women as a group: "The general concensus
is that the mortality differential between men and women cannot be satisfactorily ex-
plained by environmental, occupational or economic differences and that women do have
an innate biological or genetic advantage over men." FORUM, supra note 18, at 1220.
20. HUEBNER, supra note 10, at 91; FACT BOOK, supra note 9, at 117. See I.
RUBINOW, SOCIAL INSURANCE 318 (1969) for a presentation of the basic facts underlying
annuities in elementary and non-technical language. See Note, Sex Discrimination and
Sex-Based Mortality Tables, 53 B.U.L. REv. 624, 625-35 (1973) for a highly technical and
well-researched presentation of the same issues.
21. Note that this is one aspect in which an annuity differs from a life insurance
policy. An insured holding an ordinary life insurance policy pays premiums which ac-
cumulate in a lump sum. Upon the death of the insured the insurer will pay out the face
amount of the policy. The insured is contributing toward a lump sum payment upon death;
the annuitant is contributing toward the payment of a certain sum at certain intervals until
death. As the Indiana Supreme Court stated in Reilly, "An annuity insures against the risk
of living too long while a life insurance policy insures against the risks resulting from
premature death." 360 N.E.2d at 173.
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account must be adequately funded to provide monthly benefits for the
lifetime of its annuitants and must have the resources available from
which to make these monthly payments. The account's managers must
know, approximately at least, how much money will be required to meet
these obligations. Mortality tables must allow those who manage the
annuity account to accurately estimate the amount needed to provide
these monthly payments.22
If an annuitant fulfills his or her life expectancy, as reflected in the
mortality tables, such annuitant will receive the full benefit of his or her
contribution, no more, no less. If the annuitant should exceed his or her
life expectancy, this annuitant's additional monthly benefits would be
derived from the contributions of those annuitants who failed to fulfill
their life expectancies. If, on the other hand, the annuitant should die
before his or her life expectancy, the annuitant would not receive the full
benefit of his or her contribution and the excess would go to provide
income for those who do outlive their life expectancies. In this way the
annuity system provides a financially sound arrangement whereby one's
financial needs during the retirement years are assured of being satisfied
irrespective of whether one exceeds, fulfills, or fails to fulfill one's life
expectancy .23
In the context of an annuity fund, the use of sex-based mortality
tables leads to the problems found in Reilly and Manhart. In Reilly,
Mary Robertson contributed the same amount into the fund as did a
similarly situated male teacher, yet she received a smaller monthly
annuity payment,24 because, theoretically, she will live a longer time
during which to collect the monthly payments. In Manhart, the plaintiff
received the same monthly payment as a similarly situated male employ-
ee but she had to contribute more into the fund to obtain it.25 Her equal
22. See HUEBNER, supra note 10, at 163-74 for how to determine the amount of an
annuitant's contribution.
23. Id. at 92.
24. 360 N.E.2d at 172.
25. 553 F.2d at 583. This article is concerned only with this specifically mentioned
differential treatment of annuitants resulting from the use of sex-based mortality tables.
Other features of retirement plans have also been the subject of suit. See Rosen v. Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973) (men subject to higher optional and
mandatory retirement ages before they could receive full benefits). Accord, Bartmess v.
Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971);
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 390 F. Supp. 278 (D. Conn. 1974), rev'd in part and aff'd in part on
other grounds, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 365 F. Supp. 957
(D. Md. 1973), aff'd in part, 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1976). See also two Social Security
cases: Califano v. Goldfarb, 97 S. Ct. 1021 (1977); Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968).
342 [Vol. 13:338
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monthly benefits cost more since she, again theoretically, will live longer
to collect them.
2 6
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
Reilly v. Robertson
Mary Robertson, the Indiana school teacher, filed suit against the
Board of Trustees of the Indiana State Teachers' Retirement Fund and
against its members as individuals.27 She alleged that the board's use of
sex-based mortality tables would result in her receiving approximately
fifteen dollars less per month in retirement benefits than male teachers of
the same age and teaching experience. She advanced four theories of
recovery based upon the board's adoption and use of the sex-based
mortality tables. Specifically, she alleged that the board had violated: (1)
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution28 and the rights and privileges clause of
the Indiana Constitution; 29 (2) the Civil Rights Act of 1871,30 (3) Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (4) the obligation of contracts
clauses in the United States Constitution31 and the Indiana Constitution.
32
The trial court held, inter alia, that the use of separate mortality tables
26. Both Mary Robertson's and Marie Manhart's annuities were paid to them through
a group pension and retirement program set up by their employers. According to figures in
the FAcr BOOK, supra note 9, at 36, in 1975 11,230,000 other state and municipal
employees were covered by pension and retirement programs set up by their employers.
For the figures on other types of employees covered, see id.
27. The suit, filed as a class action, was brought on behalf of the class of female
teachers retired or eligible for retirement. 360 N.E.2d at 172. But see Spirt v. Teachers
Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 416 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) in which the plaintiff
teacher was denied class action certification on the grounds that the issue presented was a
narrow one whose resolution would not be assisted by the maintenance of the suit as a
class action. Spirt had charged that the use of sex-based mortality tables and the resulting
disparity in treatment of female teachers violated the fourteenth amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal Pay Act of 1963.
28. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV states in pertinent part: "No state shall. . . deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
29. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 23 states: "The General Assembly shall not grant to any
citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not
equally belong to all citizens."
30. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 as codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
32. IND. CONST. art. 1 § 24.
1977]
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deprived Mary Robertson and her fellow female teachers of equal protec-
tion and equal privileges, in that there was no rational basis for the
classification of retired teachers by sex, and that the differential pay-
ments constituted an unlawful employment practice under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 33
On appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court, the board challenged these
holdings. 34 The board argued that the classification of annuitants by sex
served to promote the objective of the teachers' retirement legislation by
insuring the financial security of the fund. Further, the board argued that
it was more equitable for men to be paid greater annuity benefits than
women because men as a group do not live as long as women as a group
and therefore have a shorter period of time after retirement in which to
collect periodic payments. Finally, the board contended that payment of
equal annuity portions would be tantamount to requiring the men in the
plan to subsidize the women.35
The Indiana Supreme Court decided that in order for the the use of
sex-based mortality tables to comport with the equal protection clause,
the classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall
33. 360 N.E.2d at 172. The trial court also held that the board members were not
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and that the board had not impaired the obligation of
contracts. Because it had severed the trial of the issues of liability and damages, the trial
court appointed a master to investigate the amount of individual damages for members of
the class. The master's fee was assessed against the fund. On appeal, the board challeng-
ed the excessiveness of the master's fee and the scope of the directions given him by the
trial court. Id. at 179-80.
34. Id. at 173. Also challenged on appeal was the decision that the use of separate
mortality tables violated both the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and the
supremacy clause of Article IV of the United States Constitution. The Indiana Supreme
Court did not consider any of the contentions other than the one concerning the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the equal privileges clause of the
Indiana Constitution. The court regarded the determination of unconstitutionality under
equal protection analysis as a sufficient basis for affirming the trial court. The determina-
tion of unconstitutionality under the Indiana Constitution gave the decision adequate and
independent state grounds on which the U.S. Supreme Court could conceivably have
based its denial of certiorari. See Reilly v. Robertson, 98 S. Ct. 73 (1977).
35. 360 N.E.2d at 176-77.
The court also noted that the tables in question were adopted for use by the Fund in
1972.
Prior to 1972 the Fund for many years in making the calculation of annuity
portions used a mortality table which did not subclassify annuitants by sex, and in
fact similarly situated male and female annuitants received the same amounts.
The contributions of men and women teachers have been equal. The eligibility
requirements for participation in the retirement program have been the same for
men and women. And both prior to and after 1972, the life expectancy of women
as a group has been greater than that of men as a group.
Id. at 173. See note 81 infra.
[Vol. 13:338
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be treated alike. "36 The court found that the object of the legislation was
"to provide an incentive to all teachers to remain in teaching as a lifetime
career and to accept the moderate salaries paid teachers, and to forego
opportunities in other areas of employment as they may arise." ' 37 In
deciding that the classification of annuitants by sex was arbitrary and
without rational relationship to the object of the legislation, the Indiana
Supreme Court basically adopted the findings of the trial court, which
had emphasized (1) that sex is only one of innumerable factors influenc-
ing life expectancy and other such factors are ignored; (2) that group
mortality statistics ignore the traits of the individual female; (3) that
82.9% of females will have the same year of death as 82.9% of the
males;3 8 and (4) that additional income given retired males monthly will
permit them to live in retirement more comfortably than retired
females 39
With respect to the arguments of the board,' the court pointed out
that there was no evidence that adoption of sex-based mortality tables
would insure the financial security of the fund.4' Since the court's
emphasis was on the equality of monthly payments, not the equality of
lifetime payments, the board's second argument likewise carried little
weight. Equality of payments would result when all similarly situated
teachers received equal monthly payments, not when male teachers as a
36. Id. at 175. The court said that the classification must satisfy this same standard to
comport with the rights and privileges clause of the Indiana Constitution. The standard
enunciated is that of the traditional, rational basis equal protection scrutiny. See F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). It is the easiest standard to
satisfy as it presumes the classification is constitutional and gives the defendant great
latitude in proving that it is reasonable. The court found it unnecessary to apply a higher
standard of review to the classification in question because the classification could not
even satisfy the rational basis test. See notes 70-74 infra and accompanying text for a
discussion of fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis.
37. 360 N.E.2d at 176. The legislation involved was IND. CODE ANN. §§ 21-6-1-1 to 21-
6-1-13 (Burns 1975) (repealed 1976). For the present law see IND. CODE ANN. §§ 21-6.1-1-3
to 21-6.1-7-10 (Bums Cum. Supp. 1977). There is no indication as to how the court
identified the legislative purpose. "As described both by the parties and the trial court, it
is to provide an annuity for teachers who retire with the funds which they contribute based
on the teacher's age at the nearest birthday at the time of beginning service. . . based on
actuarial computations .... " Brief of Amicus Curiae, Ass'n of Indiana Legal Reserve
Life Insurance Companies, at 11.
38. Consequently the females dying in the same year as the males, will have received
fewer benefits.
39. 360 N.E.2d at 176. The last finding of the trial court was emphasized by the
Indiana Supreme Court. The court stressed the importance of having an equal amount of
monthly income with which to meet equal daily human needs. "By providing greater
payments to men, the. .. Fund has provided men with a greater panoply against risks
arising from daily human needs." Id. at 178.
40. See notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
41. 360 N.E.2d at 176. Here the supreme court looked to the finding of the trial court
that a mortality table which ignored the sex of the annuitant had been used for many years
8
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group received the same amount over a lifetime as women teachers as a
group. The board also argued that if, as the court asserted, the purpose of
the pension legislation was to encourage teachers to remain in teaching,
that purpose would by frustrated by requiring a male teacher to, in effect,
provide, through his contribution, some of the money which would be
used to pay a female teacher's benefits.42 The court concluded that the
possibility of this influencing a male teacher to leave the teaching
profession was speculative and remote.43 The court also felt it was likely
that a male teacher would consider any such differential in light of the
equal manner in which male and female teachers have qualified by
service, age, and contribution, and in light of the equal daily human
needs faced by both male and female annuitants. Upon such con-
sideration, the male teacher would discount such differential in deciding
whether to accept some offer of employment outside public school
teaching.44
Thus, the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the difference in
treatment according to the sex of annuitants, resulting from the different
group mortality experience, bore no real and substantial relationship to
the purposes of the legislation. Therefore, the adoption and use of the
sex-based mortality tables violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment and the equal rights and privileges clause of the
Indiana Constitution.45
prior to 1972 during which the solvency of the fund was not placed in jeopardy to any
degree. See note 35 supra.
42. This situation would arise, argued the board, since, if the benefits are required to
be equal, the already equal contribution levels would have to be raised to provide the
funds for the increase in the monthly benefits of female teachers. 360 N.E.2d at 177.
43. Id. It should be noted that the retired teacher's monthly payment is made up of a
pension portion and an annuity portion. The pension portion is approximately 87% of the
total check, is paid solely from contributions of the state, and is the same for all teachers
who are similarly situated with respect to age, years of service, salary, and date of
retirement. The annuity portion is approximately 13% of the total check and is paid solely
from contributions of the teacher into the annuity account. Id. at 173. The board uses the
sex-based mortality tables in question to calculate only the annuity portion of the check. It
is because this annuity portion makes up only 13% of the total check that the court found
that the chances of a male teacher's leaving teaching because of the subsidation factor to
be remote. Id. at 175.
44. Id. at 177. It has been suggested that this part "of the opinion [is] a little muddy. A
more logical explanation would have been to recognize the difference in group effect, but
to provide that it was justified because of the overriding purpose of the statute." Letter
from Lewis C. Bose for amicus curiae Ass'n of Indiana Legal Reserve Life Insurance
Companies to Daniel F. Case, American Council of Life Insurance (June 23, 1977); on file
in Tulsa Law Journal office.
45. The decision is interesting in that it does not address the issue of the board's intent
in using the sex-based mortality tables: Whether the discrimination, resulting from their
adoption and use, was purposeful on the part of the board. The U.S. Supreme Court has
held that a discriminatory effect of legislation, which is indeed present in Reilly, is not
[Vol. 13:338
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Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water and Power
Marie Manhart, an employee of the City of Los Angeles, Depart-
ment of Water and Power also filed suit against her employer. 46 She
claimed that the policy of the department which required her to contribute
approximately fifteen percent more to the department's retirement plan
than a male employee identically situated violated (1) Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964; 47 (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) the fourteenth
amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and (4) Article 1, sections 1 and 21
of the California Constitution.48 The district court had held that the
department's practice of requiring women to make larger monthly con-
tributions to the retirement plan constituted discrimination "against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex,"
within the meaning of Title VI. 49 The district court supported its holding
enough to cause a violation of the U.S. Constitution. Demonstration of a discriminatory
purpose for the legislation is critical in making out an equal protection violation. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976). See also notes 80-81 infra and accompany-
ing text.
46. This action was a class action in which Manhart was joined by Carolyn Mayshack
and other employees of, and retirees from, the department. The defendants also included
the Board of Commissioners of the Department, the Board of Administration of the
Department's Employees' Retirement, Disability, and Death Benefit Insurance Plan, the
department's chief accounting officer, and department's general manager. 553 F.2d 581,
583 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 51 (1977).
47. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin;
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
48. The California Constitution provides in the respective sections that: "All men are
by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. "No
special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked,
or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted
privileges or immunities which, upon such terms, shall not be granted to all citizens."
CAL. CONST. art. I, § I. See 553 F.2d at 584.
The only contention addressed by the ninth circuit was the first one dealing with Title
VII. The progress of Manhart in and out of the district court was quite tortured. See id. at
584-85. One of the judgments appealed was an injunction issued by the district court
prohibiting larger contributions from women than from men and requiring restitution of
the excess contributions previously paid. Another judgment of the district court on appeal
was that granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the
retirement plan, by requiring larger contributions from female than from male employees,
violated Title VII. This summary judgment mentions nothing about Manhart's other three
claims. It is these two judgments which the court of appeals considered in Manhart. It
should also be emphasized that while Reilly was an appeal from a judgment issued after a
trial on the merits, Manhart was an appeal from summary judgment on plaintiff's motion.
49. 387 F. Supp. at 982.
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by looking to the basic requirement of Title VII: that an individual
evaluation of an employee be made rather than a prediction made on the
basis of a sex-defined group.50
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the department
admitted that requiring women to make larger contributions dis-
criminated against women, but maintained that the discrimination was
one based on longevity rather than on sex. The department urged that the
discrimination was not the kind of invidious discrimination which Title
VII was intended to abolish.51 The department explained its reliance on
longevity as a basis for requiring larger contributions from women by
pointing out that women get the same monthly benefits upon retirement
as do men and on the av&age, women live approximately five years
longer than men. For these reasons, women must, as a group, contribute
more.
52
The opinion of the court of appeals recognized that there were
business justifications for the use of sex-based mortality tables. Similar-
ly, the court agreed that an informed prediction of an individual's
longevity is a relevant characteristic in determining how large an indi-
vidual's retirement contribution should be. Since it is impossible to
determine when an individual will die at the time when the contribution
rate is set, the court recognized the value in allowing group longevity
statistics to be attributed to the individual members of a group. Of even
more importance to the court, however, was the underlying purpose of
Title VII: "[T]o require employers to treat each employee as an individu-
al and to make job related decisions about each employee on the basis of
relevant individual characteristics, so that the employee's membership in
a. . . sexual group is irrelevant to the decisions." 53 Thus the court was
faced with a situation in which the relevant individual characteristic-
longevity-cannot be measured for each individual, and an attempt to
measure it on a group basis gives rise to a per se violation of Title VII.54
50. "The basic principle . . . is that sexual discrimination under [Title VII] exists
whenever general fact characteristics of a sex-defined class are automatically applied to
an individual within that class." Id. at 983.
51. 553 F.2d at 585.
52. Whereas the annuity portion of the retirement plan involved in Reilly, 360 N.E.2d
at 173, was financed solely through employee contributions, the retirement plan involved
in Manhart was financed by employee contributions matched 110% by the department.
See Henderson v. Oregon, 405 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Ore. 1975) for a case in which a plan
almost identical to that involved in Reilly was held to violate Title VII. The decision cited
and relied heavily on the district court opinion in Manhart, 387 F. Supp. 980.
53. 553 F.2d at 585 (emphasis added).
54. It should be noted that although it is valid to state that women as a class live longer
than men as a class, there is a substantial range of standard deviation within the class.
[Vol. 13:338
11
Smith: Equal Protection, Title VII, and Sex-Based Morality Tables
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1977
SEX-BASED MORTALITY TABLES
The department argued the applicability of several exceptions to
Title VII and the court considered each in detail. The bona fide occupa-
tional qualification (BFOQ) defense is applicable only when sex dis-
crimination is necessary to protect the essence of a business function.
55
Assuming the business function of the department was to provide em-
ployees with a stable and secure pension program, the court found no
evidence that protecting this business function required sex-based mortal-
ity tables. The court found that use of such tables may be convenient but
pointed out that individual distinctions other than longevity could have
been considered.56
The department also argued that the Bennett Amendment to Title
VII permitted the use of sex-based mortality tables.5 7 The department
identified the "factor other than sex," on which a differential wage
payment may be made, as longevity. The court replied, "[I]t does not
seem reasonable to us to say that an actuarial distinction based entirely on
[A]nalysis of men and women in the general population shows that 68.1% of each
of two equal samples of men and women aged 65 exhibit the same mortality
patterns. Only 16% of the group, women, live longer and only 16% of the group,
men, die sooner than the overwhelming majority of both men and women partici-
pants.
Bernstein & Williams, Title VII and the Problem of Sex Classifications in Pension Pro-
grams, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1220 (1974). See note 39 supra and accompanying text
for statistics cited by the Indiana Supreme Court in Reilly.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ [an employee] on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business or enterprise ....
56. Other longevity features pointed out by the court included smoking and drinking
habits, weight, health, and family longevity features. 553 F.2d at 587.
57. The Bennett Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970), has been incorporated
into Title VH provisions of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970). The Bennett
Amendment provides in part:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the
wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such
differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
The Equal Pay Act states that:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in Which such employees are employed,
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of
of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance
of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant
to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any
other factor other than sex. . ..
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
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sex is 'based on any other factor other than sex'. Sex is exactly what it is
based on." 58
An extensive study was made of the legislative history surrounding
both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. Congressional intent surrounding
the Equal Pay Act was found in a Senate report. 9 As interpreted by the
court, this report indicated that if an employer could show that he would
be economically penalized by eliminating a wage differential based on
sex, or could show that he would incur significant costs because of
employing a particular sex, the Secretary of Labor could authorize an
exception to the terms of the Equal Pay Act. This exception would allow
the employer to continue a wage differential based on sex.6 This
Congressional report was of no assistance to the department's cause,
however, since there was nothing in the record to show that the Depart-
ment would be "economically penalized" by not requiring higher pay-
ments from women, and the department did not claim it would be so
penalized.61 The department "requires higher contributions only because
it believes that the pension fund itself will thereby be better funded and
easier to administer. '62 Finding no support for the department's use of
sex-based mortality tables, the court held that such practice violated Title
VII.63
58. 553 F.2d at 588.
59. S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1963).
60. 553 F.2d at 588-89.
61. See 387 F. Supp. at 984 n.1.
62. 553 F.2d at 589. There is little legislative history surrounding the sex discrimina-
tion aspect of Title VII. However, a few hours after the passage of the Bennett Amend-
ment to Title VII, Senator Hubert Humphrey responded to a question concerning differ-
ences of treatment between men and women in industrial benefit plans, including earlier
retirement options for women. Senator Humphrey said that there was no doubt that such
differences could continue in operation under Title VII and that the Bennett Amendment
had made the point perfectly clear. 110 CONG. REC. 13663-64 (1964). See notes 92-93 infra
and accompanying text. This piece of legislative history was also found to be of no
assistance to the department, as the colloquy in question took place "hours after the
passage of the Bennett Amendment and cannot be said to be part of the legislative history
of the amendment." 553 F.2d at 589.
63. The court stated:
We emphasize that our holding rests on the clear policy behind Title VII of
requiring that each employee be treated as an individual. Setting retirement
contribution rates solely on the basis of sex is a failure to treat each employee as
an individual; it treats each employee only as a member of one sex. . . . Our
holding is limited to the proposition that when sex is singled out as the only, or as
a predominant, factor, the employee is being treated in a manner which Title VII
forbids.
553 F.2d at 590-91. The second part of the court's opinion dealt with the argument of the
department that it should not be required to refund the plaintiffs' excess contributions.
The court held that the department was required to make the reimbursement to satisfy
"the compelling claim of the plaintiffs to recover the money which they were wrongfully
required to contribute." Id. at 592.
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In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in General Electirc
Co. v. Gilbert64 the department petitioned for a rehearing of Manhart.
The court of appeals found Gilbert inapplicable. 65 The analysis in Gil-
bert was of, as the Supreme Court termed it, a facially neutral policy. To
violate Title VII such policy must be shown to have a discriminatory
impact; this impact was not evident in Gilbert. The court of appeals
pointed out that the analysis in Manhart was of a facially discriminatory
policy: contribution rates based solely on sex. Consequently, no dis-
criminatory impact need be shown. This policy violated Title VII unless
it could come within one of Title VII's exceptions and the court had
found it could not. 66
While the Supreme Court, in Gilbert, had emphasized the inconsis-
tent administrative agency rulings regarding pregnancy-related disability
plans, the court of appeals in Manhart emphasized the consistency of
administrative rulings regarding employee contributions to retirement
plans. 67 The court considered as typical a ruling by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission dealing with the exact question before the
court: "[S]ex-based actuarial tables cannot be used by an employer to
justify [the requirement of] a higher contribution from members of one
sex where benefits to members of both sexes are the same. "68 Thus, the
court concluded that the decision in Gilbert did not require a change in its
judgment that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was violated by a
retirement plan in which women were required to contribute more than
men.
64. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). In this case, the Supreme Court held that a disability plan
which did not cover pregnancy-related disabilities did not violate Title VII. An unlawful
employment practice which violates Title VII is sex-based discrimination. Since the
Supreme Court had previously held, in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), that such a
disability plan was not sex-based discrimination (as it was not based on gender as such but
on pregnancy), and since there was no discriminatory effect shown, there was no unlawful
employment practice to trigger a violation of Title VII.
65. 553 F.2d at 592 (petition for rehearing).
66. In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the Supreme Court relied
heavily on Senator Humphrey's statement after the passage of the Bennett Amendment.
429 U.S. at 144. See note 62 supra and accompanying text. Although the court of appeals
recognized that it was bound by such reliance, it refused to change its opinion even though
it had disregarded that piece of legislative history. 553 F.2d at 593.
67. 553 F.2d at 593-94 (petition for rehearing). Consideration of administrative rulings
played a large part in the original opinion in Manhart as well as in the opinion denying the
department's petition for rehearing. See notes 94-103 infra abd accompanying text.
68. EEOC Dec. 075-147, Jan. 13, 1975, [1975] 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6447.
As the dissent points out, the majority dismissed a Wage and Hour Administration
regulation on which the Supreme Court in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976), had placed much emphasis. The regulation provides that
[t]he mere fact that the employer may make unequal contributions for employees
of opposite sexes in [a plan providing insurance or other benefits to employees]
1977]
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It is obvious that the use of sex-based mortality tables results in
different treatment of similarly situated annuitants. But does this differ-
ential treatment violate either the Constitution or Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964? The courts in Reilly and Manhart respectively
found that it did. As previously stated, this article concurs with the
decision in Manhart but disagrees with that in Reilly. This position is not
inconsistent because a practice which violates the sex discrimination
prohibitions of Title VII does not necessarily constitute sex discrimina-
tion in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution.6 9
The Fourteenth Amendment
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment guarantees
every person equal protection under the law. 70 Originally the Supreme
Court required that, to be consistent with the equal protection clause, a
classification must be "reasonable, not arbitrary, and . . . rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly situated shall be
treated alike. "71
will not, however, be considered to indicate the employer's payments are in
violation of [the Equal Pay Act], if the resulting benefits are equal for such
employees.
29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1976). The majority explained that this provision contemplates
employer contributions, not compulsory employee contributions such as are involved in
the case at bar. 553 F.2d at 594.
69. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976). However, the dissent in
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 154, n.6 (Brennan, J.), argued that the majority
had implied "that the Fourteenth Amendment standard of discrimination is coterminous
with that applicable to Title VII." That case, though, involved a facially neutral classifica-
tion not based on gender as such. See note 64 supra and accompanying text. The majority
found no showing that the classification discriminated against women, which would be
necessary to establish a violation of Title VII when a facially neutral classification is
involved. The analysis of a facially neutral classification under the fourteenth amendment
or under Title VII requires that a discriminatory effect must be shown. If this is not
apparent, the analysis stops and the classification violates neither provision. This was the
situation in Gilbert. Where a facially discriminatory classification is involved the analysis
differs.
70. Note that the prohibition is directed to the states. The fourteenth amendment does
not affect private action or purely social relationships. Since the defendants involved in
the immediate cases were state governmental units, the fourteenth amendment proscrip-
tion applied to them. A different situation would present itself if an individual woman
purchased an annuity through a life insurance agent and was adversely affected by the
insurance company's use of sex-based mortality tables. Whether the fact that the insur-
ance industry is heavily regulated by the states would result in a private insurance
company's action being termed state action, and thus subject to the fourteenth amend-
ment, is debatable. See Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. Rav. 840
(1974).
71. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 US. 412, 415 (1920).
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This standard, often referred to as the rational basis test, has been
applied by the Court unless a "suspect classification" or a "fundamental
interest" is involved.72 If either of these is involved the Court will
exercise "strict scrutiny." In other words, the classification must be
necessary to achieving a legitimate state purpose. 73
Sex has never been regarded as a suspect classification, but neither
has the Court automatically applied the rational basis test to a classifica-
tion based on sex. Instead, the Court has required that a classification
based on sex "must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of the objectives."' This inter-
mediate standard is not as severe as the strict scrutiny reserved for
suspect classifications and fundamental interests, but it is more demand-
ing than the rational basis test. Unlike the rational basis test, there is no
presumption that the legislation creating the classification is constitution-
al. This "strict rational basis test" was not applied in Reilly75 but will be
applied for the purposes of this article's analysis.
It is obvious that the first step in this analysis is the identification of
the governmental objectives on which a classification is based. In the
context of Reilly, it is necessary to examine two objectives-the objec-
tive behind the development of the Indiana State Teachers' Retirement
Fund, and the objective behind the Fund's use of sex-based mortality
tables. The Indiana Supreme Court decided that the first objective was to
provide an incentive to all teachers to remain in a teaching career and to
accept moderate teaching salaries, foregoing other employment opportu-
nities. 76 The second objective, behind the use of sex-based mortality
tables, was to provide a solvent, self-sustaining annuity fund for
teachers.
The objective of providing an incentive for teachers to remain in
teaching is undoubtedly an important one. The incentive comes from the
teacher's expectation of receiving a certain monthly payment during
retirement for as long as he or she should live. The incentive, however, is
not the expectation of receiving a certain total sum. The Indiana Supreme
Court correctly pointed out that what is important is having the monthly
72. Suspect classifications recognized by the Court are race, alienage, and illegitima-
cy. Fundamental interests recognized by the Court are voting, criminal appeals, and the
right of interstate travel. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L.
REV. 1065 (1969).
73. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
74. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
75. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
76. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
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income to meet daily human needs. 77 Through the use of sex-based
mortality tables a male teacher has a greater monthly income. Therefore,
the Indiana Supreme Court found that classification of annuitants by sex
had no real and substantial relationship to the identified governmental
objective.
A consideration of the second objective leads to a different conclu-
sion. It is undisputed that a self-sustaining annuity fund is an important
governmental objective. This annuity fund was intended to function in
accordance with insurance concepts. 78 The amount of monthly benefits
payable was matched to both the contribution rate and to the estimated
period over which such benefits were to be payable. The use of sex-based
mortality tables permits an accurate determination of both benefits and
contributions. Thus, the use of sex-based mortality tables creates a
classification which is substantially related to the achievement of this
important governmental objective.
It is contended that this analysis by the Indiana Supreme Court was
incomplete. 79 After finding that a classification by sex is discriminatory,
it is necessary to question whether this discrimination is purposeful.
Demonstration of a discriminatory purpose is critical in making out an
equal protection violation.80 An examination of the defendants' argu-
ments establishes that the defendants believed the treatment of male and
female annuitants was equal."' As a class, women would receive as much
benefit from the annuity fund as men because, theoretically, they would
live longer. The purpose therefore, was not to discriminate against
female annuitants, but to insure that all annuitants were treated equally in
terms of total benefits.
Thus, if the Supreme Court had granted certiorari to Reilly, the
Court probably would have upheld the distinction between male and
female annuitants as not violative of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Using the strict rational basis test, the classifica-
tion based on sex serves the important governmental objective of a
solvent, self-sustaining annuity fund; the classification is substantially
77. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
78. The Board of the Indiana State Teachers' Retirement Fund was authorized to
conduct an actuarial investigation at least once every six years to determine the level of
contributions necessary to provide the required benefits. 360 N.E.2d at 173.
79. See note 45 supra.
80. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-245 (1976).
81. The dissent in Reilly argues that the purpose behind the change to sex-based
mortality tables, see note 34 supra, was to remedy what the Board of Trustees of the fund
saw as unequal treatment of male and female annuitants existing before adoption of the
tables: Male and female teachers made equal contributions and, upon retirement, were
given equal monthly benefits.
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related to the achievement of that objective and thus is constitutional.
Even if the classification based on sex does not serve the other important
governmental objective, of providing an incentive for teachers to remain
in teaching, the resulting discrimination is not violative of the equal
protection clause because it is not purposeful.
Title VII
An analysis of sex-based mortality tables in terms of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,82 yields a different answer. The practice of
using sex-based mortality tables, which results in female annuitants
being required to pay more or receive less than male annuitants, violates
the sex discrimination prohibitions of Title VII. 83
This analysis involves several considerations: Title VII itself, a
provision of the Equal Pay Act, the interpretations of Title VII by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the interpre-
tations of the Equal Pay Act by the Wage and Hour Division. The
Bennett Amendment to Title VII brought a section of the Equal Pay Act
within the provisions of Title VII.84 This means that the same exceptions
permitted by the Equal Pay Act are available under Title VII. Thus, an
employer charged with sex discrimination under Title VII has two possi-
ble defenses: the BFOQ defense under Title V1185 and the "any factor
other than sex" defense under the Equal Pay Act as incorporated into
Title VI. 8
6
Because of the fact. . . that women have a greater life expectancy than men, the
result was an unequal treatment based upon sex. This unequal treatment favored
women retirees, in that as a group they received the same monthly benefits, but
received them for a longer period of time due to their longevity.
It is obvious from the facts of the case that the Board determined that such
unequal treatment should not prevail and that the sexes should be treated equally.
360 N.E.2d at 180.
82. See note 47 supra.
83. This conclusion agrees with that of every article, except one, which has con-
sidered the issue. See Bernstein & Williams, Title VII and the Problem of Sex Classifica-
tions in Pension Programs, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1203 (1974); Gold, Equality of Opportunity
in Retirement Funds, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 596 (1976); Developments in the Law-Employ-
ment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109
(1971); Note, Sex Discrimination and Sex-Based Mortality Tables, 53 B.U.L. REv. 624
(1973); Note, Mortality Tables and the Sex-Stereotype Doctrine: Inherent Discrimination
in Pension Annuities, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 323 (1975). But see Gerber, Economic and
Actuarial Aspects of Selection and Classification, 10 FORUM 1205 (1975).
84. See note 57 supra.
85. See note 55 supra.
86. Note that both these defenses were considered by the court of appeals in
Manhart. See notes 55-62 supra and accompanying text. Another defense which an
employer raised several years ago, that Title VII doesn't even apply to retirement funds,
no longer seems valid. See Bartmess v. Drewrys, U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). For a discussion of this issue, using the rationale of the
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Title VII forbids distinctions based on sex with respect to an indi-
vidual's hiring, discharge, compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment. As the court in Manhart pointed out, that type
of distinction is exactly the one made by the City of Los Angeles,
Department of Water and Power. "A greater amount is deducted from
the wages of every woman employee than from the wages of every man
employee whose rate of pay is the same. . . . The higher contribution is
required specifically and only from women as distinguished from
men." 8 7 Such a policy is discriminatory on its face. Unless the employer
can raise some defense to the mandate of Title VII, this type of discrimi-
nation must fail.
One defense which can be raised to a charge of discrimination in
violation of Title VII is the BFOQ defense: an employer is allowed to
hire an individual on the basis of the individual's religion, sex, or
national origin in those certain instances where such a characteristic is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise. Although this defense
was considered and subsequently rejected in Manhart, a careful reading
of Title VII reveals that it cannot be used as a defense by an employer
charged with discrimination in regard to the compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment. 88 The language of the statute specif-
ically restricts the application of the BFOQ defense to situations involv-
ing hiring and employment. Since an employee benefit plan, of which an
annuity fund is a part, is relevant to the compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, discrimination in the operation of such a
plan cannot be justified on the basis of the BFOQ defense.8 9 An employer
may hire or refuse to hire an individual on the basis of a bona fide
occupational qualification, but once an individual is hired, the employer
court in Bartmess as a framework, see Gold, supra note 83. This argument seeks to avoid
having to come within an exception to the prohibition of Title VII by denying the
applicability of Title VII to employee benefit programs in the first place. The federal
district court in Manhart, 387 F. Supp. at 982, joined five federal circuits in affirming at
the outset that Title VII applies to retirement funds. Gold, supra note 82, at 599. The court
of appeals in Manhart apparently agreed, as it didn't even consider the issue before
holding that a violation of Title VII had occurred.
A more valid argument, perhaps, is that the Equal Pay Act does not, without the
Bennett Amendment, apply to retirement funds. See Note, Sex Discrimination and Sex-
Based Mortality Tables, supra note 83. Note, too, that the Supreme Court in General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), did not question Title VII's applicability to
employee benefit programs.
87. 553 F.2d at 593.
88. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970). See
notes 47, 55, supra for the text of these statutes.
89. See B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON, & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION
AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 243 (1975).
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must treat that individual as all other employees are treated. 90 Thus the
BFOQ defense is of no assistance to the defendant in this circumstance.
A second defense the employer may utilize in defending an alleged
violation of Title VII is that the Equal Pay Act permits the discrimina-
tion. This act allows unequal pay for equal work if the "payment is made
pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differ-
ential based on any other factor other than sex.''91 In support of this
interpretation of these statutes, an employer charged with operating a
discriminatory employee benefit program can rely on the legislative
history of the Bennett Amendment, which incorporated this provision of
the Equal Pay Act into Title VII. The purpose of the Bennett Amendment
was to make it unmistakably clear that differences of treatment in indus-
trial benefit plans, including earlier retirement options for women, may
continue under Title VII. This contention emanates from a statement
made by Senator Hubert Humphrey subsequent to the passage of the
Bennett Amendment.' 2 The court in Manhart however dismissed
Senator Humphrey's remark as an erroneous interpretation of the Equal
Pay Act.93 Since the Bennett Amendment on its face merely states that
the inequality in payments allowed under the Equal Pay Act will be
allowed under Title VII, the answer of the court in Manhart seems the
best answer to an argument based on this legislative history.
Employers faced with a charge of discrimination may seek to come
within one of the factors allowing for unequal pay. In Manhart, the
employer sought to justify the requirement that female employees con-
tribute more to the annuity fund by saying the requirement was pursuant
to a differential based on a factor other than sex, namely, the disparity in
longevity between men and women. Since this actuarial distinction,
90. Where the BFOQ defense can be validly raised, it has been narrowly interpreted.
The EEOC has directed this interpretation, see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1976), and the
courts have agreed. "[N]ecessary to the normal operation of that particular business"
(emphasis added) has been held to mean that "discrimination based on sex is valid only
when the essence of the business operation would be undermined." Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971). As the court in Manhart correctly
pointed out, "Discriminating against women in setting the amount of retirement contribu-
tions in no way affects the ability of the Department to provide water and power to the
citizens of Los Angeles." 553 F.2d at 587. See also note 55 supra and accompanying text.
91. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
92. See note 62 supra and accompanying text. Senator Humphrey apparently felt that
the Equal Pay Act allowed sex-based differences in retirement ages and benefits and that
this allowance was carried over into Title VII by the Bennett Amendment. This interpreta-
tion of the Bennett Amendment has been criticized since the Equal Pay Act made no such
provisions. Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra note 83, at 1173 n.37.
93. 553 F.2d at 589. See note 92 supra.
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which allows a determination of costs, distinguishes only along sexual
lines, it cannot be claimed that the differential is based on a factor other
than sex.
94
IV. THE REQUIEMENTS OF TrLE VII
Equal Contributions and Equal Benefits
The use of sex-based mortality tables, which results in greater
contributions by women for equal annuity benefits, violates Title VII,
and employers' defenses are inapplicable. Therefore, it is necessary to
determine what Title VII requires of employee benefit programs. The
fundamental precept of Title VII, as stated by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, the agency charged with administering and
enforcing Title VII, is that generalizations relating to sex cannot be
permitted to influence the terms and conditions of an individual's em-
ployment, even where the generalizations are statistically valid.95 EEOC
guidelines issued in 1972 set out what is required of fringe benefits of
employment to comply with Title VII: "It shall be an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer to have a pension or retirement plan which
. . . differentiates in benefits on the basis of sex.' '96 In addition, the
EEOC has stated that Title VII is not concerned with whether benefits to
each sex group as a class are equal, but with whether individual benefits
are equal.97 This same guideline says that "[i]t shall not be a defense
94. This argument has also been addressed by the Wage and Hour Administrator, the
official in charge of administering and enforcing the Equal Pay Act. According to the
Administrator, a differential based on claimed differences between the average cost of
employing females, as a group, and the average cost of employing males, as a group, does
not qualify as a differential based on any factor other than sex and results in a violation of
the equal pay provisions. 29 C.F.R. § 800.151 (1976). Note that a third defense exists
which may be available to some employers: the judge-made doctrine of business necessi-
ty. The business necessity defense can be raised by an employer when the discrimination
charged results from a policy which is neutral on its face. This situation is to be distin-
guished from the Manhart situation in which the discrimination is not neutral on its face.
The business necessity defense was first articulated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971). In order to establish the defense, an employer must establish that (1) the
act which is discriminatory does more than serve a legitimate managerial function; (2) the
act is essential to the ends of safety and efficiency; and (3) there are no less discriminatory
alternatives. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
Assuming that this defense was available to an employer who operated an annuity fund
and assuming that the use of sex-based mortality tables met the first two requirements, the
third requirement could not be met, as there are other factors besides sex on which
mortality tables could be based. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
95. EEOC Dec. *75-147, Jan. 13, 1975, [1975] 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6447
(emphasis in original).




Smith: Equal Protection, Title VII, and Sex-Based Morality Tables
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1977
SEX-BASED MORTALITY TABLES
under Title VII to a charge of sex discrimination in benefits that the cost
of such benefits is greater with respect to one sex than the other. "98
The EEOC has also issued two administrative decisions which,
when read together, indicate how the EEOC, whose opinions are entitled
to great deference, 99 interprets this requirement of Title VII. The first
decision involved an employer who contributed lower monthly pension
payments to female annuitants than to male annuitants on the basis of
sex-based mortality tables which indicated that females had a greater life
expectancy. The EEOC regarded this practice as highly suspect and
stated that compliance with Title VII required periodic pension benefits
paid to males and females in equivalent circumstances to be equal."°° The
second decision concerned a situation in which an employer required its
female employees to contribute more to the retirement plan than similarly
situated male employees. Referring to the previously discussed decision,
the EEOC found, as an inescapable corollary, that an employer may not
require a higher contribution from members of one sex where benefits to
members of both sexes are the same. 10 1
Through these decisions, the EEOC has interpreted Title VII as
requiring both equal contributions and equal benefits. Furthermore, equal
benefits does not refer to a statistically determined average total payment
received by members of the same sex. It refers to "a pension of x dollars
per month.' 12 Therefore, an individual female annuitant can not be
required to contribute more to, or to receive less per month from, an
annuity fund than a similarly situated male annuitant.
The opinions of the Wage and Hour Administrator are also relevant
to a determination of what is required of an annuity fund. While the
Wage and Hour Administrator has not been as consistent as has the
EEOC, in requiring both equal contributions and equal benefits, 03 the
Administrator has ruled that the classification of employees solely on the
basis of sex for purposes of cost comparison violates the Equal Pay
Act.""° Since this is exactly what sex-based mortality tables do, it is a
98. Id. Although this regulation is more on point with the situation found in Reilly, i.e.
a differentiation in benefits on the basis of sex rather than a differentiation in contribu-
tions on the basis of sex, it shows that Title VII requires equal benefits even if the cost of
such benefits is greater for one sex than the other.
99. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
100. EEOC Dec. 074-118, April 26, 1974, [1975] 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6431.
101. EEOC Dec. *75-147, Jan. 13, 1975, [1975] 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6447.
102. Id.
103. See note 68 supra.
104. 29 C.F.R. § 800.151 (1976). See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
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valid assumption that use of such tables constitutes a violation of the
act.105
According to Manhart, if an employer requires female employees
to contribute more to an annuity fund than male employees, it is in
violation of Title VII. According to the EEOC, if either contributions or
benefits are unequal, the employer is in violation of Title VII. Obviously
the employer must dispense with sex-based mortality tables since their
use results in either unequal contributions or unequal benefits. But the
employer must then find some way to determine costs and benefits. The
court of appeals in Manhart left open the legality of determining contri-
bution rates based on a number of actuarially significant characteristics,
one of which is sex. 10 6 Another possibility is the use of a unisex mortality
table. 10
The Male Annuitant's Reaction
A discussion of Title VII requirements for annuity funds would be
incomplete without a word about the reaction of male employees. Both
the Indiana Supreme Court in Reilly and the dissenting judge in Manhart
addressed the issue of the male employee whose monthly benefits remain
the same while his monthly contribution to an annuity fund administered
in accordance with Title VII requirements is increased. The employee
may feel that he is being required to subsidize the female employees. He
may believe that women as a class will receive more in annuity benefits
than men as a class if both individual contributions and individual
benefits are equal. The second circuit has spoken on the subject of the
unhappiness of employees who are faced with measures necessary to
105. However, as previously noted, the Wage and Hour Administrator has also ruled
that an employer has a choice: either make equal contributions for each employee into an
annuity fund or provide equal annuity benefits for each employee. 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d)
(1976). If this interpretation were followed, both the situation in Reilly (equal contribu-
tions) and the situation in Manhart (equal benefits) would conform to the Equal Pay Act
even though inequality in payments is legal only as long as it is based on factors other than
sex. See note 94 supra and accompanying text. This interpretation by the Wage and Hour
Administrator also conflicts with the consistent interpretations by the EEOC. See notes
94-98 supra and accompanying text. Since the EEOC is charged with interpreting Title VII
its opinions are entitled to greater weight.
106. 553 F.2d at 591.
107. This table would, in effect, result from an averaging of the existing male and
female tables. Since the unisex table would contain an average of male and female
death/life expectancies, the fund would, on the average, benefit from each male partici-
pant, and lose from each female participant. One problem with such a table is that it could
result in the underfunding of an annuity fund where the majority of contributors are
female employees. See Gold, supra note 83 at 627. Gold suggests determining the costs of
an annuity program through the use of sex-based mortality tables and then, by use of a
unisex table, spreading the costs equally among all the participants, regardless of sex.
[Vol. 13:338
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redress past discrimination: "If relief under Title VII can be denied
merely because the majority group of employees, who have not suffered
discrimination, will be unhappy about it, there will be little hope of
correcting the wrongs to which the Act is directed."'10 8 Similarly, when
an annuity is considered as a certain monthly payment for as many
months as the annuitant lives, instead of as a lump sum depending on
how long the annuitant lives, the major problem is solved. The purpose
of an annuity is not to secure a total dollar benefit equal to every other
annuitant, but to assure that a check arrives each month and does so for
the rest of the annuitant's life. It is immaterial that another annuitant,
either male or female, is still alive, still receiving checks, and will
ultimately collect a greater total sum. The male annuitant knows that the
similarly situated female annuitant worked as many years as he did, was
paid the same salary, and contributed the same amount into the annuity
fund. The male annuitant should realize that she faces the same expenses
in retirement that he does. It is unreasonable to assume that with such
knowledge, he would begrudge the female annuitant her equal monthly
benefit on the basis that she may outlive him.
The underlying premise of an annuity fund is subsidation. The
annuitant who exceeds his life expectancy receives his additional month-
ly benefits from the contributions of those annuitants who failed to fulfill
their life expectancies. 109 The male annuitant is already subsidizing those
male annuitants who exceed their life expectancies and the female annui-
tant is already subsidizing those female annuitants who exceed their life
expectancies. The subsidation of one annuitant by another exists as the
financial mainstay of the fund. A plan requiring equal benefits and equal
contributions would be merely a change in form wherein all annuitants
would subsidize those annuitants who exceed their life expectancies, as
opposed to men subsidizing men and women subsidizing women.
CONCLUSION
The use of sex-based mortality tables is deeply entrenched in the
insurance industry for valid business reasons. Insurance deals with
groups of people, not with individuals, and equal treatment of groups is
what the insurance industry believes to be financially sound. Women as a
class live longer than men as a class and so they should either pay more
There is no doubt that the insurance industry could remedy the problem and alleviate
the discrimination if it so desired. One possible solution would involve a modified unisex
table based upon the percentages of male and female annuitants benefited by the fund.
108. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663 (2d Cir. 1971).
109. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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for the annuity benefits they receive or receive smaller benefits over their
longer lifetime. But an employer subject to the dictates of Title VII, who
operates an annuity fund, must treat each employee as an individual. The
employer cannot allow sex-based generalizations to influence the
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of an
employee. Sex-based mortality tables embody the generalization that
women live longer than men. This generalization substantially influences
the terms on which women participate in the annuity fund. Consequently,
the use of sex-based mortality tables results in discrimination toward
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